We study monetary policy under di erent central bank constitutions when the labor-market insiders set the nominal wage so that the outsiders are involuntarily unemployed. If the insiders are in the majority, the representative insider will be the median voter. We show that an independent central bank, if controlled by the median voter, does not produce a systematic in ation bias, albeit equilibrium employment i s t o o l o w from a social welfare point of view. A dependent central bank, in contrast, is forced by the government to collect seigniorage and to take the government's re-election prospects into account. The predictions of our theory are consistent with the evidence that central bank independence decreases average in ation and in ation variability, but does not a ect employment v ariability.
Introduction
Europe's nations have c hosen a status of independence for the European Central Bank on the conviction that independence is a necessary condition for avoiding an in ation bias in monetary policy. This conviction has been nourished by the unmatched stability record of the Deutsche Bundesbank. Measured over the post-war period, German CPI in ation has been 2:8 percent o n a verage, which is signi cantly less than in the other industrialized countries. Furthermore, as Blinder 1998 notes, post-war averages are shaped by the extraordinary in ation waves of the 1970s and early 1980s that were unleashed by the Vietnam war, the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, and two large oil price shocks. If the turbulent period 1970 82 is excluded, German in ation has been 2:0 percent o n a verage. This favorable result can be equated with the virtual absence of an in ation bias given that for measurement reasons the true rate of price level change is overestimated by the measured rate and that su cient nominal interest rate variability requires a positive in ation rate. 1 In fact, the Bundesbank has been led over decades by the notion that a measured rate of price level change of 2 percent represents the desired state of price stability.
Surprisingly, there is no economic theory that can explain why the Bundesbank has resisted the temptation of letting in ation have its way. F or example, Rogo 1985 developed a model of an independent central bank where the bankers, who are more conservative than the government, produce lower in ation than the government, but in that model the in ation bias vanishes only in the extreme case that employment stabilization is disregarded. Estimates of the Bundesbank's reaction function by Clarida and Gertler 1997 con rm that the Bundesbank does stabilize the real economy. 2 Recent alternative suggestions were to eliminate in ation bias through an in ation contract Walsh 1995 or an in ation target Svensson 1997 . This does not help to explain 1 For the US, Boskin, Dulberger, Gordon, Griliches and Jorgenson 1998 estimated that measured CPI in ation exceeds true CPI in ation by 0 :8-1:6 percentage points and Orphanides and Wieland 1998 showed that an in ation target of 2 percent is required to ensure that the non-negativity constraint for nominal interest rates is not binding in the conduct of stabilization policy.
2 Taking the short-term interest rate as the policy instrument they nd a signi cant response to monthly observations of industrial production. Note that this signi cance vanishes when annual data is used and deviations of money growth from target are taken as the policy instrument; see Neumann 1997. the Bundesbank's record either, because it has never worked under an in ation contract or an in ation target.
The present paper develops a new model of central bank independence that can explain the absence of an in ation bias in Germany. The point of departure from the literature is to call into question the standard assumption that the objective of monetary policy is social welfare. Existing contributions typically assume, implicitly or explicitly, that all individuals are identical. Under this assumption social welfare, de ned in an utilitarian way as the weighted sum of all individual utilities, equals the representative agent's utility. Since, trivially, the representative agent is also the median voter, it is then natural to assume that social welfare is the objective of monetary policy. A plausible justi cation is that the government is elected by the median voter and that the central bank's status of independence can survive only if it is backed by the median voter. 3 Matters are completely di erent if, as in this paper, it is assumed that individuals are not identical. In particular, the median voter's utility then di ers from social welfare and identifying the policy objective with social welfare has no descriptive content.
In order to make our point formally, w e develop a simple model in the spirit of Blanchard and Kiyotaki 1987 . In each sector of our economy, one trade union has the monopoly power to set the nominal wage that is to be paid to all workers. Given the standard assumption that unions care only about the well-being of their members, the insiders", they will reduce aggregate employment at the expense of the non-union members, the outsiders". The presence of monopoly unions is thus distortionary and equilibrium employment i s l o wer than is desirable from a social welfare point of view. This implies that our model is capable of reproducing the familiar in ation bias of the Barro-Gordon analysis, provided that the monetary authority's objective function is taken to be social welfare. However, for the reasons outlined above, we subscribe to the positive view that the median voter's utility, instead of social welfare, counts. In our model the median voter is an insider, because only if the monopoly unions are backed by the majority of the population, they can survive, implying that the majority of the population must be insiders. The key point to notice now is that the insiders are against the creation of surprise in ation other than for the stabilization of unanticipated productivity shocks. The reason is that since they are fully employed, a creation of surprise in ation aimed at increasing employment b e y ond the natural rate would hurt them, as it drives them o their desired employment, lowers their real wage and leads to costly in ation.
Given that the independent central bank cares about the median voter, we derive results that are in stark contrast to the literature. First, in our model equilibrium in ation no longer depends on the di erence between the natural rate level of employment and the higher level that is desirable from a social welfare point of view. Instead, the independent central bank provides zero in ation on average. Second, the independent central bank stabilizes employment optimally from the median voter's point of view as well as from the social welfare point of view.
Though the median voter plays a decisive role in our analysis, she cannot avoid an in ation bias if the central bank is dependent. In this case a political business cycle in in ation arises as in Fratianni, von Hagen and Waller 1997 and Lohmann 1995 , stemming from the government's attempt to fool the median voter so as to improve the re-election prospects. Moreover, the government m a y force the dependent central bank to create more seigniorage than is optimal from the median voter's point of view. This occurs because the government v alues revenues that can be collected without e ort on its part Persson, Roland and Tabellini 1996 . As a result, a principalagent problem emerges and the dependent central bank is found to create higher average in ation and a higher in ation variability than the independent central banker, while employment v ariability remains una ected. These predictions of our theory are in line with the stylized facts of the large body of cross-country studies of the correlations between the legal degree of central bank independence and the level and variability o f in ation and employment; see e.g. Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini 1991 , Cukierman 1992 , Alesina and Summers 1993 and Eij nger, Schaling and Hoeberichts 1998 The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we describe the labor market structure and the objective functions of di erent players; Section 3 provides the equilibrium solutions when the central bank is independent and the policy objective is either social welfare or the median voter's utility; in Section 4 we i n troduce rational retrospective voting and show that the standard results obtain when the central bank is dependent; Section 5 concludes.
The Model
Our model is similar to that used by Herrendorf and Lockwood 1997 . It has the following actors: a government, a central banker and a large number of identical trade unions and rms. 4 In each sector of the economy, there is one rm, which sells its product in a competitive market, and one trade union, which has monopoly power over wage setting a so-called monopoly union. The number of union members, the insiders, is taken to be the same across sectors and is exogenously given. 5 We also assume that the number of non-union members, the outsiders, is the same in each sector and denote the share of insiders in the total labor force by s. Note that, otherwise, the outsiders would have an incentive to migrate to sectors with relatively fewer outsiders, where job prospects are more favorable for them, providing the number of insiders is the same across sectors. Finally, w e suppose that the monopoly unions set the nominal wage and the rm determines employment.
The sequence of events in each period is as follows: i each trade union sets the nominal wage, w t if not mentioned explicitly, all variables are in logarithms ; ii a productivity shock t occurs and is observed only by the central bank; iii the central banker chooses the price level, p t , the value of which is not observed by a n yone else at the time of action; iv a shock, t , to the government's competence occurs, the realization of which is observed only by the government; v the average per capita employment, l t , is determined by rms labor demand and is observed by e v erybody l t equals the log of total employment in hours divided by the number of workers ; vi if the period is odd, an election is held; vii the realizations of p t and t are observed. With regards to the elections, we assume that the simple majority o f v otes decides whether the incumbent i s re-elected or a randomly drawn challenger replaces her.
Given the nature of the nominal wage contracts, employment in each sector is determined by the labor demand of this sector's rm. We assume that the economywide average per capita employment depends on the real wage, the productivity shock, t , and the competence of the incumbent, t : 6 l t = p t , w t + t + t ; 1 t t t,1 + t ; 0 0; As in Rogo and Sibert 1988 , the innovation t to the incumbent's level of competence has a positive impact on aggregate employment. The two shocks t and t are taken to have zero covariance and to be independently, identically, and uniformly distributed with zero means and compact supports ,x ; x and ,x ; x , 0 x ; x 1. The de nition of t captures the idea that competence shocks are incumbent speci c. They therefore carry over to the next period only if the incumbent remains in o ce.
In order to distinguish the insiders from the outsiders, we make the key assumption that the per capita employment of a representative insider is larger than that of a representative outsider. In particular, we assume that rms nd it optimal to hire such that the per capita employment of insiders and outsiders is given by Note that since there is a continuum of measure one of identical sectors, the value of any economic variable must be the same in each sector and on the aggregate. We therefore do not need to distinguish between the two.
Wage-setting is modelled by supposing that each trade union maximizes the expected utility of it's representative member. 7 We assume that insiders and outsiders have the same individual preferences, preferring a higher over a lower real wage and disliking deviations of employment and of in ation from the respective bliss points, l and 0. In particular, the present discounted utility as of period t is
denote the economy-wide average per capita employment levels i.e. employment in hours divided by the total number of individuals in the work force desired by insiders and outsiders, respectively. Our assumptions imply that, ceteris paribus, insiders prefer a lower level of average per capita employment than outsiders,
Given the utility function 4, we can derive semi-reduced forms for the nominal wage and for employment, still depending on the actual and the expected price level. Maximizing the expectation of 4 subject to labor demand 1 while taking in ation expectations as given results in the following rst-order condition for a typical trade union's choices of the nominal wage:
where the natural rate of employment is de ned as l n l i , 1=a. Substituting 5 into 1 yields a semi-reduced form for employment:
We see that a positive competence shock in the current period implies that in the next period workers can take home a higher real wage if the incumbent is still in charge, without adverse consequences for employment. Thus, if the incumbent continues to be in power, both the insiders' and the outsiders' utility in period t + 1 increases in the realization of the government's competence shock i n t. 8
Monetary Policy Under Central Bank Independence
In this section, we model monetary policy under an independent central bank. Necessary and su cient conditions for central bank independence are institutional and personal independence from government Neumann 1991 . Institutional independence means that the government cannot directly interfere with the implementation of monetary policy, which requires that government representatives do not have a s a y on the central bank board and that the central bank cannot be forced to nance government debt. Personal independence from the government can be achieved through long-term appointments and by prohibiting early removal from the o ce and reappointment. Both institutional and personal independence are granted by the laws of the more independent central banks, such as the Swiss National Bank or the Bundesbank. In particular, the Bundesbank Law explicitly prohibits monetizing government debt and stipulates that the o cial term length is eight y ears, which doubles due to the practice of unconditional reappointment. An independent central banker has no reason to please the government and can therefore maximize its own objective function. To relate our framework to existing work, we rst replicate the standard results of the literature, which t ypically assumes that independent central banks are concerned with some form of social welfare function.
The Standard Theory
The seminal contribution on the delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank is due to Rogo 1985 , who build on Barro and Gordon 1983. These authors had assumed that the government maximizes social welfare. Applying the standard utilitarian notion that social welfare is the sum of all individual utilities, the government's objective function in our setting becomes: As in Barro and Gordon, equilibrium in ation is found to exhibit a systematic in ation bias, a=b l , l i , which is is proportional to the di erence between the average" employment target, l, and the insiders' lower employment target, l i . To understand the analytical form of this bias, note that a social planner if she could set the nominal wage and in ation so as to maximize welfare would target the weighted average of the natural rates preferred by the insiders and by the outsiders, i.e. s l i + 1 , s l o = l , 1=a, instead of l i ,1=a. The existence of monopoly trade unions has the consequence that the equilibrium real wage is too high and equilibrium employment i s t o o l o w from a social welfare point of view. Since the wage setters take i n to account that a benevolent central banker tries to correct for this, the systematic in ation bias in 9b is proportional to the discrepancy between the social planner's preferred natural rate and the prevailing natural rate, l , l i . Rogo 1985 pointed out that the in ation bias can be reduced if an independent central banker is appointed who puts a weight on in ation that is higher than society's weight. The cost of reducing in ation bias comes from the fact that the conservative central banker does not stabilize employment optimally. Rogo showed that there is a nite degree of weight conservatism such that credibility and exibility are traded o optimally. So, average in ation under a conservative central banker is positive and Rogo 's model does not t the record of the Deutsche Bundesbank, which has virtually achieved price stability and, at the same time, stabilized the real economy. This observation motivated our paper.
A New Theory
Here, we drop the assumption that an independent central bank is guided by an objective function of the form 7. The key question then is which objective function an independent central bank adopts. We argue that while independence means independence from government, it does not mean the lack of constraints or outside control. The main point to notice is that simple majorities of parliament can typically change the central bank law, even for the relatively independent central banks, such as the Deutsche Bundesbank or the Federal Reserve. This allows the median voter to threaten a misbehaving" central bank board with cuts in the bank's operating budget, changes in their term length, and the introduction of more demanding reporting requirements. Since all of these measures a ect negatively the o ce rent of the central bankers, the threat of using them should impose serious constraints on how far the monetary policy stance can deviate from that preferred by the median voter. Alt 1992 makes this point with respect to the US and provides empirical evidence that one principal of the Federal Reserve is Congress; see also Grier 1991. In Germany, similar forces are likely to be at work, as a simple majority of the parliament can alter the Bundesbank law.
The above argument suggests that the median voter's preferences should play a prominent role in an independent central bank's objective function. However, there has been some discussion on whether the Deutsche Bundesbank nonetheless behaves in partisan fashion. In particular, Vaubel 1997 suggested that the members of the Central Bank Board attempt to support the government in pre-election periods if they share its political a liation. However, Neumann 1998 and Berger and Woitek 1997 do not nd statistically signi cant evidence. Consequently, w e neglect this possibility and assume that the objective function of an independent central bank is given by These solutions drive home the key result of our analysis: the independent central bank does not generate an in ation bias. The reason is that the bank does not attempt to systematically increase employment b e y ond the prevailing natural rate, because the trade unions have already picked the levels of the real wage and of employment that are optimal from the insiders' point of view. Any surprise in ation, created to raise employment systematically, w ould reduce the insiders' real wage rate in exchange for an undesired increase in the economy-wide average of per-capita employment that does not bene t the insiders. The only type of surprise in ation desired by insiders is the one directed at dampening the impact of unanticipated productivity shocks. Solutions 11 indicate that this stabilization task is optimally ful lled from a representative insiders point of view. 10 In sum, the charter of central bank independence provides precommitment. Since this eliminates the ine cient in ation bias, it is of value to insiders as well as outsiders, and therefore to society as a whole. We conclude this section by pointing out that, in our model, the insiders do in ict involuntary unemployment upon the outsiders. To see this, consider the hypothetical situation in which the latter can set the nominal wage. With central bank independence, this would result in the following equilibrium outcomes: Comparison of the solutions 11 and 12 shows that the outsiders prefer a reduction in the wage in exchange for an increase in average per capita employment. Since the nominal wage 11a set by the insiders is higher than 12a, this must also mean that they would want t o w ork more than they do in 11c, that is, the outsiders are involuntarily unemployed when the insiders set the nominal wage.
Monetary Policy Under Central Bank Dependence
Given that the median voter is crucial for our results, it may seem that a dependent central bank, too, should provide zero average in ation, as the government is elected by the median voter. In this section, we demonstrate that this is not true. We argue that a dependent central bank will be forced by the incumbent to pursue policies that are not in the interest of the median voter.
The Government's Objective
As most of the literature, we equate the objective of a dependent central bank with that of the government. The usual justi cation is that a dependent central bank is basically a g o vernment agency. So, the question to answer here is what objective function the government will follow. Since the government is elected by the median voter, we make the common assumption that it cares about the median voter's utility. The literature on political business cycles points out that, in addition, the government will be concerned with the o ce rent it is collecting; see for example Rogo and Sibert 1988 . Since the government has to stand regular elections, this introduces an incentive to pursue opportunistic policies that are suboptimal from the median voter's point of view. 11 We assume a form of the government's utility function that captures both the government's concern with the median voter's utility and with securing its o ce rent, captures the part of the incumbent's utility from holding o ce that is independent of in ation. This may include the incumbent's salary which in OECD countries is typically indexed to ex post in ation, fringe bene ts etc. As in de Kock and Grilli 1993, the other two terms are linear approximations of the seigniorage that results from unexpected and expected in ation. Since the latter is smaller than the former, we h a ve c d ; see Herrendorf 1997 for further discussion.
The assumption that the incumbent's o ce rent depends positively on seigniorage can be motivated by public choice arguments. Niskanen 1971, for example, argued convincingly that politicians tend to overspend, because they derive private bene ts from controlling a large budget, directing a large bureaucracy and the like. Recently, Persson et al. 1996 have taken the more cynical view that the incumbent g o vernment can divert the more resources for its own use, the more resources it collects. Since seigniorage is the only revenue source in our highly stylized model, these considerations suggest that it ought to a ect the incumbent's utility positively. Note that this argument will be valid also in more complete models with alternative revenue sources. The reason is that collecting seigniorage requires practically no e ort on part of the government. In contrast, the tax revenue can be increased only if the tax collection process is made more e cient or if the average tax rate is increased. As the experience of various countries suggests, this typically involves long and tedious processes of approval by parliament and subsequent implementation; see Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini 1992 for further discussion.
Equilibrium
We rst solve for the equilibrium in even periods, in which no election is held. Taking p e t as given, the government maximizes with respect to p t the expectation of 13a conditional on t and subject to 4, 5 and 6. Following the same steps as above, one nds for the equilibrium in a non-election period: Next, to solve for the equilibrium in an odd period when an election takes place, we need to analyze rst the voting decisions of individuals. Since the competence shock t a ects the individual utilities in period t + 1 if and only if the incumbent remains in o ce, it is optimal for all individuals to have t+1 = 1 t+1 = 0 if and only if t is larger smaller than zero. In other words, both insiders and outsiders wish to re-elect the incumbent if and only if she experiences a positive competence shock in the election period. In contrast, since the potential challengers of the incumbent do not have a draw of t , their expected competence for period t + 1 is zero and it is optimal to elect the challenger whenever t 0.
The key assumption of rational retrospective v oting models is that in an election period t voters cannot observe t but only l t , l n , which is the sum of p t , p e t , t and t . Since they wish to re-elect competent incumbents and replace incompetent ones, they will form an optimal forecast of t based on the observed realization of l t , l n . The incumbent then has an incentive to fool the voters by creating surprise in ation, because the expansionary e ect of surprise in ation on employment cannot be distinguished from that of a positive competence shock. To solve the model, we restrict attention to Markov-perfect strategies. The state variable in period t is the realization of last period's competence shock, t,1 . W e postulate that in an odd period t individuals re-elect the incumbent, if and only if l t , l n 0. Together with the uniformity of the distribution of Given these expressions, we can solve for the Markov-perfect equilibrium of the game. It will be shown below that, indeed, it is optimal for individuals to vote for the incumbent if and only if l t , l n 0. The government's optimal in ation choice in an election period can be found by taking the rst derivative with respect to p t of the expectation of 13a conditional on t and subject to 4, 5, 6 and 15 incumbent has no chance on the margin to improve her re-election prospects through the creation of unexpected in ation, we assume that this condition holds.
Comparing 14b and 16d shows that a dependent central bank creates an ination bias c=b in all periods. Furthermore, in election periods, an additional bias r g + cd=b=2bx arises. The biases are due to the principal-agent problem that stems from the incumbent's motive to collect seigniorage and to win elections. The trade unions understand these incentives and set higher nominal wages. Consequently, v oters are not fooled in equilibrium and employment remains una ected. In other words, our model predicts a political business cycle in in ation but not in employment.
Our theory also predicts that the variances of in ation and employment are unrelated to the status of the central bank; see Table 1 for the analytical details. As regards the variance of employment this is consistent with the cumulative empirical evidence; see e.g. Grilli et al. 1991 , Cukierman 1992 , Alesina and Summers 1993 and Eij nger et al. 1998 . The prediction of an una ected in ation variance, in contrast, may seem to contradict the facts. However, this must not be the case, as the standard estimatê theory, which predicts that an independent central bank stabilizes less and therefore increases employment v ariability.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has departed from the observation that we lack a theory of central bank independence that can explain the stability record of the Bundesbank. Time-consistent monetary policy yields excessive in ation even in the model of Rogo 1985 where the government appoints independent central bankers who are more conservative. We have presented a new theory. The key assumption is that the independent central bank maximizes the welfare of the median voter instead of social welfare. As a result, and in contrast to the standard theory, an independent central banker stabilizes the real economy and, nevertheless, provides zero in ation on average. The reason for this is that our central banker is independent from the government but not from the median voter. The dependent central banker, in contrast, cares about the government's desire to collect seigniorage and to improve the re-election chances. Consequently, an in ation bias cannot be avoided.
The assumption that independent central bankers take the median voter's utility as the policy objective is realistic because the median voter can change the central bank law. Note as a further implication of our theory that central bank independence will be the outcome if the government should put up a referendum on the constitution of the central bank. However, the government of our model may not wish to propose such a referendum because with central bank independence it would loose the grip on seigniorage. Finally, it goes without saying that all results depend on which c haracteristic of the median voter is made the focal point. We h a ve put the focus on the characteristic of being an insider in the labor market who sets an excessively high wage level and forces involuntary unemployment upon the outsiders. Alternatively, the median voter might be a net creditor; see for example Faust 1996 . We leave it to future research to explore what di erent implications that may h a ve for monetary policy under di erent central bank constitutions.
